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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOSEPH E. FERRERI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040838 - CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for Custodial Interference, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2004). 
TABLE OF DETERMINATIVE 
STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (2004) is determinative and provides: 
(1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if, 
without good cause, the actor takes, entices, conceals, or detains a child 
under the age of 16 from its parent, guardian or other lawful custodian: 
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so; and 
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period substantially longer 
than the parent-time or custody period previously awarded by 
a court of competent jurisdiction. 
1 
(2) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if, 
having actual physical custody of a child under the age of 16 pursuant to a 
judicial award of any court of competent jurisdiction which grants to another 
person parent-time, visitation, or custody rights, and without good cause the 
actor conceals or detains the child with intent to deprive the other person of 
lawful parent-time, visitation, or custody rights. 
(3) Custodial interference is a class A misdemeanor unless the child is removed 
and taken from one state to another, in which case it is a felony of the third 
degree. 
This and any other provision cited in the body of this brief are reproduced in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
On or about March 22, 2004, the State of Utah filed an Amended 
Information against Defendant alleging: 
Count I- Custodial Interference, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-303 (2004), occurring on or about March 18, 
2004. 
R. 10-11. After Defendant's Initial Appearance and one Pretrial Conference, 
Defendant demanded a trial by jury, which the Court scheduled for August 23, 
2004. R. 27. On August 23rd and 24th, 2004, a jury of six persons convicted 
Defendant of one count of Custodial Interference, a class A misdemeanor. R. 57. 
Defendant filed an appeal of his conviction on or about September 22, 2004. R. 68-
9. 
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Summary of Facts 
Defendant and his ex-spouse, Ms. Billie Rogers ("Rogers"), were married in 
August, 2000. R. 82:71. The marriage produced one child, Jaycee ("Jaycee"), in 
2001 and ended by divorce in January, 2003. R. 82:73. The Sixth District Court 
(the "Court") presided over the parties' divorce and awarded Jaycee's physical 
custody to Rogers, yet reserved weekly visitation to Defendant. R 82:74. 
Defendant's actions, leading to the charge before this Court, are little more 
than a continuation of a history of frivolous acts conducted by Defendant. 
Subsequent to the parties' divorce, Defendant filed three Orders to Show Cause 
against Rogers. SE-4:5. In the Court's Findings and Order, the Court found that 
Defendant's "allegations and these Orders to Show Cause [were] not brought in 
good faith and the allegations [had] no merit." Id. Ultimately, the Court awarded 
attorneys fees to Rogers as a result of Defendant's filings. Id. 
Defendant's visitations with Jaycee took place following the divorce, 
although not without various episodes of strain and confusion. R. 82:74, 215; R. 
83:35-6. Such strain and confusion is evidenced by the prophylactic measures 
each party took during the exchange of Jaycee at visitation pick-up and drop-offs. 
R. 82:86-8; R. 83:35-6. 
While living with Rogers, Jaycee enjoyed a good relationship with her 
grandfather, referring to him as her "Poppa." R. 82:173. Usually, at the time of 
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Defendant's pick-up of Jaycee, Rogers Ji I 11 , »l physically 1 tai id Jaycee to 
Defendant; inst juher Mr. Rogers, or Rogers' step-father, Clayton Despain 
("Despain"), effectuated the transfer of Jaycee to the Defendant. R. 82:104. 
Defendant received Jaycee at the Rogers' home from Despain on numerous 
occasions. R. 82:173. 
Sometime in mid-February, 2004, Rogers Iittsband, A *< new 
empl« . ng. R. 82:80. The Rogers family searched for a residence 
near Mr. Rogers' new employment eventually finding a home in Kemmer, 
Wyoming. R.82:80-l. Rogers did not dispute that Defendant had rights to visit 
Jaycee. R. 82:81. Further, she did not believe the move would substantially affect 
Defendant's right to visitation as, according to Rogers, the difference ii i tra\ el tin le 
from ^ouui joidan to Kemmer, Wyoming was 
only approximately fifteen minutes. R. 82:81. 
Rogers testified that soon after finding a residence she provided Defendant 
with notice of the family's pending move, utwo or three times in person." FL 
82:81. However, Defendan; u ••. not accept Rogers' notice always tolling ini lo 
"pul iting." R. 135-8 and SE 6. Rogers claimed she sent Defendant notice 
by virtue of a certified letter sent on or about March 9, 2004. R. 82:81, DE 1. 
After receiving notice that the Rogers family planned a move to Wyoming, 
Defendant continued to exercise his right to visitation with Jaycee. On March 2, 
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2004, Defendant traveled to the Rogers' home with Mr. Harry Zieber - an 
acquaintance of Defendant's, who went with Defendant to observe the pickup of 
Jaycee from the Rogers' home in Gunnison, Utah. R.83:34-5. Defendant returned 
Jaycee to Gunnison on March 4, 2004. R.83:168. Next, on March 10, 2004, 
Defendant traveled to the Rogers' home accompanied by Mr. Steven Jorgensen 
("Jorgensen"), a friend of Defendant's who again went with Defendant to observe 
Jaycee's pickup. R. 83:44, 83:49. Jorgensen observed that the Rogers family 
appeared to be preparing to move as evidenced by a horse trailer in the front yard 
with some pieces of furniture and some boxes loaded inside. R. 83:46. No 
testimony or evidence was provided by either party that any conflict occurred 
when Defendant returned Jaycee to Rogers. 
On or about March 12, 2004, Defendant filed an Exparte Motion for 
Temporary Order ("the Exparte Motion") and an Affidavit in Support of Ex Parte 
Order in the Sixth Judicial District Court. SE 4 and SE 3. Later, the same day, 
Sixth District Court Judge, David Mower, who was not the judge assigned to the 
matter, denied Defendant's Exparte Motion. SE 5. On March 17, 2004, the 
assigned judge, Judge K.L. Mclff, confirmed Judge Mower's denial of Defendant 
Exparte Motion, then faxed and mailed said denial to Defendant's counsel. SE 5. 
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Tuesday, Marc I 11 " ' M it approxin ady 6:00 pm, Defendant and his 
friend, Maurine Smith Ramos arrived at Rogers' home in Gunnison to pickup 
Jay cee and exercise his visitation rights. R 82:102. Rogers was at home with her 
stepfather, Despain, packing items in preparation for her family's upcoming move. 
R 82:102. Many packed boxes were stacked in the house and some itei ns vv ere still 
loaded into < - , • : • > • .e. K. 5Z:IUJ>. ! television, 
phone, and iniscellant ^^ personal items remained in the home. R. 82:103. 
Rogers' packing was not complete. R. 82:103. 
Defendant came to the Rogers' front door to pick up Jay cee. Despain 
answered the door and presented Jaycee to Defendant while Rogers remained in 
the kitchen. R. 82:104. % i s- i defendant received Jaycee, Despain closed dmr door 
and rvtiimnj t<» assisting Rogers' preparation to move. R. 82:104. 
Rogers expected Defendant to return Jaycee to her home around 7:00 pm on 
Thursday, March 18 . R. 82:105-6. However, Defendant failed to return Jaycee 
to the Rogers residence during the evening of March 18th, nor d efendant 
contact Rogers to explaii I such failure. R. 82: 111. Rogers coi itacted h t. 
enforcement and reported Defendant's failure to return Jaycee sometime around 
i t 
8:30 pm on March 18 . R. 82:108. Rogers received no communications from 
Defendant until approximately 11:00 am the following day. R. 82:111. At that 
time, Defendant called Rogers and explained that he was not returning Jaycee to 
Rogers' home in Gunnison. R. 82:112. Defendant did not return Jaycee to the 
Rogers' home on Friday, March 19th. R. 82:105-8. 
Law enforcement sought an arrest warrant for Defendant, which was signed 
by Sixth District Court Judge David Mower late in the afternoon of March 18, 
2004. R. 82:197. 
Additionally, on or about March 18, 2004, Defendant filed a Verified 
Petition for Child Protective Order ("the Verified Petition") in the Third Judicial 
District Court. DE 11. In filing the Second Motion, Defendant indicated that he 
had not filed for a protective order in the Third Judicial District or any other 
District in the State of Utah and that "no cases of any type (divorce, custody, other 
protective orders, etc.)...[had] been filed in any court." DE 11. The Third District 
Court denied Defendant's Motion approximately one-half-hour later. Def. Brief 
Egd7. 
On Saturday, March 20, 2004, law enforcement officers located Defendant, 
arrested him, and recovered Jaycee. Rogers traveled to a location in or near 
Draper, Utah and picked up Jaycee, then returned to Gunnison. R.82:114. 
Subsequently, Rogers moved to Kemmer, Wyoming. Defendant never 
exercised his right to visitation while Rogers lived in Kemmer. R. 82:81. Instead, 
Defendant threatened to sue the Rogers, had well-child checks performed on the 
family and insisted that he was not legally able to leave the State of Utah. R. 
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82:128. Rogers testified that she explored Defei* .*-! i i 
false. See R. 82:129. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State contends that Defendant's Brief is flawed due to his failure to 
marshal evidence in support of the trial court's ruling prior to attacking it. Based 
cause to detain Jaycee from Rogers, especially in context of three district court 
judges denying Defendant's baseless attempts to retain custody of Jaycee. Further, 
the jury found that Defendant's detention of the child was in fact substantially 
longer than his allowed parent time. The day following Jaycee5s expected return, 
Defendant called Rogers an < • • • • • J \ u I ' {sic) 
Defend:int was arrested < aen Rogers traveled to Salt Lake County to retrieve 
her daughter. Finally, three of Defendant's four arguments are based on the jury's 
verdict, which this Court should affirm unless it finds that reasonable minds could 
not have reached such verdict. Additionally, the Court did not err by expunging a 
sexually large against Despain. Cou emonstrate lliit ;m h 
expungement never occurred. Thus, this Court should affirm the totality of 
Defendant's conviction. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROPERLY MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS 
BEFORE ATTACKING THEM. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has consistently reminded the party attacking a 
lower court's findings of the requirement that all evidence in support of the lower 
court decision must be marshaled and then attacked. Specifically, the Court has 
stated: 
A critical requirement of appellate advocacy is the duty to marshal the evidence 
when challenging the trial court's finding of fact. In doing so, the challenger 
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw 
must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting 
upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Hoskins, 2002 UT App. 223, f 13, 51 P.3d 52 (citing West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991) (emphasis 
in original). Additionally, the Court of Appeals has held: 
A party who challenges the trial court's factual findings ""must marshal all of 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate 
that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings against an attack."" This heavy burden places a 
responsibility on counsel that is not unlike becoming a devil's advocate. Counsel 
must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very finding the 
appellant resists." 
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State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, U 6, Jf> P h\ r ^ l (ulntinn\ mi m tied! | In his 
Brief, Defendant presents four arguments for this Court to review. Defendant 
commences each argument by providing a fact or two to give context to his 
argument, then directly launches into his argument - which, oft times is little more 
than a repetition of a previous argument. At other junctures in Defendant tef, 
material facts supporting the lo^ <. t 's findings are e> \v<\\ ; u>LX-UK-,. 
I Hi iiiiaft/ly, f >efen*i;iiil is entire! . -,t ..rt.p with this Court's prior rulings, as 
Defendant's Brief fails in every respect to marshal even one ounce of evidence in 
support of the lower court's findings. As a result, this Court should reject 
Defendant's appeal and affirm the lower court decision. 
II. THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EV1DENC1 TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT, WHICH INCLUDES THE 
INFERENCE THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE GOOD CAUSE 
TO DETAIN JAYCEE. 
The evidence presented to the jury showed that Rogers and her family, were 
preparing to move from Gunnison, Utah, to Kemmer, Wyoming, due to a change in 
Mr. Rogers' employment. R. 82:78-81, 121. The evidence showed t!lat Rogers 
had a horse trailei ! ith boxes and other boxes were 
stacked both inside and outside of her home. R. 82:103-5. Rogers told the jury 
that Mr. Rogers searched for a new residence in the Kemmer, Wyoming area, but 
encountered difficulties in locating an appropriate residence. R. 82:80-1. 
Additionally, a defense witness testified that when she and Defendant arrived to 
pick up Jaycee on March 18 , the home appeared to look dark and that Clayton 
Despain was seen at Rogers' home at that time. R. 83:26-7. Rogers attempted to 
provide Defendant with notice of her move on more than one occasion. R. 82: 84-
5. At one point, she did tell Defendant that her family was moving out of state, 
approximately 142 miles from Defendant's home, and that she could not provide 
him with an address. R. 83: 38. 
a. Appeal courts hold jury verdicts in high regard, not interrupting 
such verdict absent a showing of insufficient evidence to support 
such verdict. 
Defendant contends in three of his four arguments that the Defendant's jury 
erred in their verdict. See Defs Brief. It is the responsibility of the jury to 
evaluate the evidence presented at trial and give its own weight to the evidence in 
rendering its verdict. See State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177, 186 (Utah 
2000). The appeals court will "not lightly overturn a jury verdict." See State v. 
McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985). Additionally, "a verdict rendered by a 
jury is overturned only if the evidence presented at trial is so insufficient that 
reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict." Colwell, 994 P.2d at 186. 
The Court should review the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to 
the verdict. See McClain, 706 P.2d at 605; State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983). Finally, when elements of the crime can be reasonably made from 
the evidence, including any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, the 
11 
Court should stop its inquiry and sustain the jury's verdict. See McClain, 706 P.2d 
at 605; State v. Eaton, 701 P.2d 496,498 (Utah 1985). 
While the jury heard evidence of Rogers' move and the conditions of her 
home on March 18, 2004, it did not find such conditions sufficient to provide 
Defendant with good cause to detain Jaycee from Rogers. Testimony was 
presented that such conditions existed during Defendant's pickup of Jaycee during 
previous weeks, each time Rogers was there when Defendant returned Jaycee. See 
Def. Brief at 12-3. Simply stated, after hearing the evidence presented at trial the 
jury was not convinced that based on the appearance of Rogers' home and the fact 
that she planned an upcoming move provided Defendant with "good cause" to 
detain Jaycee. 
b. Even if Rogers failed to provide proper notice to Defendant, the 
appropriate recourse lies in the civil court, not unjustified detention 
of the child. 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-37 (2004) in pertinent part provides: 
When either parent decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more 
from the residence specified in the court's decree, that parent shall provide if 
possible 60 days advance written notice of the intended relocation to the other 
parent. The written notice of relocation shall contain statements affirming the 
following: 
(a) the parent-time provisions in Subsection (5) or a schedule approved by 
both parties will be followed; and 
(b) neither parent will interfere with the other's parental rights pursuant to 
court ordered parent-time arrangements, or the schedule approved by 
both parties. 
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Defendant relies on the proposition that U.C.A. § 30-3-37, "requires the 
moving custodial party to give sixty (60) days written notice of which state the 
party is moving to and what the current address will be.'* Defs Brief at 12. 
Undoubtedly, U.C.A. § 30-3-37 required Rogers to provide Defendant notice of 
her move because her relocation was outside Utah's boundaries. U.C.A. § 30-3-37 
includes "[the moving parent] shall provide if possible 60 days advance written 
notice..." The key modifier under the statute is "if possible." Rogers testified, not 
only that she gave Defendant oral notice "two or three times in person," but that 
she sent Defendant notice by certified mail. R. 82:81. Although the family had 
not located a suitable residence until mid-March, not within the sixty day 
timeframe as required by U.C.A. § 30-3-37, Rogers made every effort to provide 
notice to Defendant as soon as possible. R. 82:82-3. Thus, when Defendant asked 
Rogers to give him an address, Rogers replied that she couldn't provide an address, 
because at that time her family had not made a decision as to what specific city or 
home in which they would reside. See R. 82:84, 132. However, nowhere under 
the pertinent statute is the requirement that Rogers provide Defendant with an 
actual relocation address. 
Regardless of whether Rogers provided proper notice to Defendant of her 
family's relocation, if Defendant objected to such relocation he did not adhere to 
proper procedure for expressing any such concerns. U.C.A. § 30-3-37(2), in 
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pertinent part, provides that either party, or the court itself, may move tne court uto 
review the notice of relocation and parent-time schedule.. .and make appropriate 
orders." Based on Rogers' testimony, she attempted to tell Defendant, "as soon as 
[Mr. Rogers] found out he had the job'' that they were relocating, but Defendant 
was unwilling to listen. R.82:83. Rogers told the jury Mr. Rogers accepted the job 
in Wyoming "towards mid-February" 2004. R.82.83. It follows that Defendant 
had at least oral notice of Rogers' move and could have taken the appropriate steps 
to gain audience with the civil court several weeks prior to the Rogers' relocation. 
Instead, Defendant chose to file his Exparte Motion and Verified Petition in 
both the Sixth and Third District Courts respectively, each containing meritless 
allegations of danger and abuse towards Jaycee in an effort to retain her in his 
custody. See SE4 and DE 11. Each document contains allegations in an attempt to 
persuade the reviewing court to believe that Jaycee was in danger of harm or 
injury. Apparently, based on the court's denials, the courts did not believe Jaycee 
to be in such dire circumstances. In reality, underlying Defendant's baseless 
allegations contained in both documents was Defendant's concern that Rogers was 
leaving the area. Defendant did not react appropriately. Both courts flatly denied 
Defendant's requests. 
Thus, even if this Court finds that Rogers did not provide Defendant with 
proper notice, the remedy is granting additional parent time to Defendant or even 
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contempt of court for Rogers, not a reversal of a criminal conviction. Conceivably, 
if this court reversed Defendant's conviction on the basis of Rogers' alleged failure 
to give proper notice of her relocation, a defendant in an analogous scenario, could 
simply kidnap a child, then when captured, merely argue his innocence based on 
the fact that his ex-spouse failed to give proper notice of her relocation. This Court 
clearly does not intend such a result. When a non-custodial parent, such as 
Defendant, does not adhere to appropriate judicial procedure and chooses instead 
to take the law into his own hands that parent must be held accountable. This 
Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
III. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JURY'S VERDICT BASED 
ON ITS FINDING THAT CONSIDERING ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, 
DEFENDANT RETAINED JAYCEE FOR A TIME 
SUBSTANTIALLY LONGER THAN HIS PARENT TIME. 
No question remains concerning whether or not Defendant filed his Verified 
Petition with the Third District Court on March 18, 2004. As stated supra, the 
Court denied said Petition within an hour. The State acknowledges that Defendant 
may well have desired to "stand before the judge, be sworn, and give testimony" 
about his concerns. Defs Brief at 17. Finally, the State agrees that Defendant 
retained Jaycee from Rogers for a limited time period from March 18 to the 20 . 
Defendant relies heavily on the 1980 decision rendered in Nielsen v. 
Nielsen. 620 P.2d 511 (Utah 1980). Nielsen is a civil case. The facts in Nielsen 
arose from the plaintiff father maintaining his child two days past his visitation 
15 
period from custodial mother, who had "an unstable history and although 
professing an intention to change, had not done so." Id. at 512. Additionally, 
mother had lived with two different men, neither of which was the father of two 
younger, illegitimate children to whom she gave birth. Id. The mother was 
unemployed, lived primarily on welfare and had been injured in an altercation with 
one of her paramours. Id. Such events were traumatic to the child. Id. In 
contrast, the non-custodial father and his wife were purchasing a home in a middle-
class neighborhood, and had a contingent of extended family in the area that would 
help in providing the child with positive influences. The question of the child's 
custody rested on the best interests of the child. 
The mother in Nielsen contended that because the father maintained the 
child for two days beyond his defined visitation period, he could have been 
charged with Custodial Interference pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-5-303. The Nielsen 
court held that the father's detention beyond his visitation period did not fall under 
the statute. The Court cited the father's "good faith belief that he had good cause, 
which the father substantiated by filing a petition to modify as reasons validating 
the father's behavior. 
The case at bar is different from Nielsen. In the past year prior to the events 
leading to this case, Defendant had filed at least three Order to Show Causes, 
complaining about his weekend visitations. See SE 1:3. The reviewing court 
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referred to Defendant's allegations in the three Orders as "not brought in good 
faith" and the "allegations have no merit." Id. The jury was privy to such 
information at trial. Defendant's filing of his Exparte Motion and Verified Petition 
are little more than a continuation of Defendant's lack of good faith and merit. 
The jury was privy to testimony from Rogers that when Defendant finally 
established contact with her, after failing to return the child, he told her, "I'm not 
bringin' [Jaycee] back." (sic.) R. 82:156. Defendant then hung up the phone. Id. 
Defendant never contacted Rogers again after the call. Jaycee was never returned 
to Rogers. Rogers had to travel to Salt Lake County to retrieve her daughter after 
Defendant's arrest. R. 82: 113-4. Based solely on the information Rogers received 
from Defendant via telephone, Defendant never intended to return Jaycee. 
On various occasions Rogers encountered problems at her home with 
Defendant when he came to pickup Jaycee. R. 82:88. In an attempt to curb such 
problems, Rogers mounted a surveillance camera above her porch to record 
Defendant's actions at the Rogers home. See SE 6. The aforementioned 
examples, taken as a whole, and placed in context with Defendant withholding 
Jaycee, provide sufficient basis for the jury's verdict that Defendant interfered by 
holding Jaycee for a period substantially longer than allowed. 
The Court of Appeals decided Nielsen nearly twenty-five years ago. Where 
the Court found that substantial interference had not occurred given the facts and 
17 
state of society at that time, we now live in a different society. Defendant retained 
Jaycee for almost two days beyond the time when he usually returned her. See R. 
82:113-4 83:76-7. Technically, in fact, Defendant never returned Jaycee. See ft. 
82:113-4. We now live in a society where parents are encouraged to contact 
authorities within hours when their child has been abducted. Such information is 
now broadcast by virtue of a system sometimes referred to as an "Amber Alert," so 
that a suspect can be located quickly via assistance from the general public. 
Without doubt, a non-custodial parent who fails to return the child to the custodial 
parent, then telephones the next day to tell a worried mother that "I'm not bringin' 
[the child] back," (sic.) certainly interfered with Rogers' custody rights by 
retaining Jaycee for a period substantially longer than his parent time. The jury, 
considering the totality of the facts presented at trial, found that Defendant had 
retained Jaycee for substantially longer than allowed. 
Based on the above-cited reasons, the Court should disavow Defendant's 
argument and uphold the jury verdict. 
IV. THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS WELL FOUNDED DUE TO 
DEFENDANT NOT ONLY FILING ONE EX-PARTE PROTECTIVE 
ORDER BUT ALSO FILING A SIMILAR PETITION IN A 
DIFFERENT COURT ONLY DAYS BEFORE. 
Defendant filed his Verified Petition in order to persuade the Third District 
Court to allow him to maintain custody of Jaycee. DE 11. Judge Lindsley refused 
Defendant's Petition within one-half hour of Defendant's filing. Defs Brief at 17. 
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Certainly, if Despain posed a sincere threat of harm to Jaycee, based on allegations 
of sexual misconduct from nearly twenty years earlier, the Court should have 
granted Defendant's Petition. 
However, Defendant neglects to inform this Court that not only did he file 
the Verified Petition with the Third District Court on March 18 , but that mere 
days earlier, on March 12, 2004, Defendant filed his Exparte Motion in the Sixth 
District Court. SE 4. In both documents, Defendant presented several unsupported 
and unsubstantiated allegations claiming that Jaycee was in danger of harm and 
encouraging the Court to order Rogers to stay away from Jaycee, to remove any 
right to Jaycee's custody from Rogers and grant Defendant custody. See SE 4 and 
DE11. 
The same day Defendant filed his Exparte Motion, Sixth District Court 
Judge David Mower denied it. SE 5. Judge K.L. Mclff, Defendant's assigned 
judge, confirmed Judge Mower's Order on March 17 . SE 5. Although the 
Courts denied Defendant's Motions, this Court should know that in Defendant's 
Verified Petition to the Third District, Defendant was not forthright in his filing. 
In the Verified Petition, Defendant indicated to the Court that he had not filed for a 
protective order in any other court of the State. See DE 11 at 3. Both the Exparte 
Motion filed in the Sixth District and the Verified Petition filed in the Third 
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District, and the misleading information Defendant included were pointed out to 
the jury during Defendant's August trial. R. 83:113, 124-5. 
Clearly, the jury had information that Defendant filed documents in the 
Third and Sixth District Courts in an attempt to have either Court grant him 
additional custody time with Jaycee. The evidence was unambiguous that three 
judges, in both the Third and Sixth Districts, reviewed Defendant's filings and 
denied them on each occasion. Thus, the jury possessed evidence beyond 
Defendant's filing of his Verified Petition to support its verdict. Defendant 
conveniently neglected to inform this Court of these filings. The Court should 
deny Defendant's appeal and uphold the jury's verdict on this issue. 
V. THE COURT NEVER EXPUNGED THE CRIMINAL RECORD OF 
THE MATERNAL STEPGRANDFATHER, WHO TWENTY YEARS 
AGO ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED A SEXUAL OFFENSE 
AGAINST A MINOR. 
The State does not dispute the fact that Rogers and her family engaged in 
moving activities throughout the time period near March 10, 2004 up to and 
beyond March 20, 2004. There is no question that the Rogers' packed several 
items in boxes, then loaded them along with various items of furniture into a horse 
trailer parked in front of their residence. R. 82:102-3. The State does not deny the 
sparse lighting conditions at the Rogers' home when Defendant picked up Jaycee 
on the evening of March 18 . R. 83:26. Finally, Despain was at the Rogers home 
and presented Jaycee to Defendant upon his arrival. R. R. 83:27. 
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During Defendant's trial, the defense attempted to introduce evidence in 
support of his position that Rogers' stepfather, Despain, had been convicted of a 
sexual offense involving a minor. R. 82: 121-2. The State never called Despain to 
the witness stand at trial. During Defendant's cross examination of Rogers, 
Defendant attempted to question her about her knowledge of Despain's criminal 
history. The State objected based on Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 (2004). 
The Court sustained the State's objection. R. 82:122. 
Rogers testified that, during her marriage to Defendant, her mother and 
Despain got along fine with Defendant. R. 82:71. Specifically, Rogers testified 
that "[Defendant and Despain] seemed to get along fine." R.82:72. Rogers also 
testified that, following the parties' divorce, Despain answered the door countless 
times when Defendant came to pick up Jaycee. R. 82:173. Defendant never 
provided any evidence to refute Rogers' testimony. The question becomes, what 
evidence did Defendant introduce at trial to support his contention that Despain 
presented a threat to Jaycee or that Despain in fact was a convicted sex offender? 
Defendant never introduced any evidence at trial to support the notion that 
Clayton Despain presented a threat to Jaycee. The only evidence presented to the 
jury was that Jaycee considered Despain her "Poppa," that Jaycee had a good 
relationship with Despain and, in fact, that Defendant picked up Jaycee for 
visitation from Despain on countless occasions. Instead, Defendant relied on bare 
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and unsupported conjecture that at some past occasion a court expunged a sexual 
offense from Despain's criminal record. To date, the State does not believe the 
Defendant understands the actual nature of events surrounding the alleged 
expungement of Despain's criminal record. 
Subsequent to Defendant's trial, the State researched the Sixth District Court 
records to ascertain the veracity of Defendant's claim. Such records are deemed 
public records. The State learned that the State of Utah filed criminal case number 
1402 ("case number 1402"), thereby accusing Despain of First Degree Rape on 
January 11, 1984. (Addendum B). The alleged event occurred nearly five months 
earlier on or before August 16, 1983. (Id.). At that time, Despain had recently 
turned twenty-four years of age. (See birth date in Addendum C). 
On February 15, 1984, subject to plea negotiations, the State agreed to 
amend the charge in case number 1402 against Despain to reflect "Unlawful 
Sexual Intercourse," a third degree felony, to which Despain entered a plea of no 
contest. (Addendum D). On March 24, 1984, the Sixth District Court sentenced 
Despain in case number 1402 to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison, but suspended 
the sentence in favor of Despain being placed on supervised probation, which 
required him to serve ninety days in the Sanpete County Jail. (Addendum E). 
Despain was allowed to serve the ninety days sometime during the next year and 
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allowed the privilege of work release. (Addendum E). The State fined Despain 
$1,000.00. (Addendum E). 
In exchange for Despain's no contest plea in case number 1402, and subject 
to his successful completion of probation, the State agreed to allow Despain to 
withdraw his "no contest" plea and enter a "not guilty plea," additionally, the State 
agreed that at that juncture, it would dismiss the felony charge in case number 
1402 against Despain. (Addendum E). 
On August 20, 1985, the Department of Adult Probation and Parole 
submitted a report to the Sixth District Court, reporting that Despain successfully 
completed his probationary period for case number 1402 and recommended that 
Despain's probation be terminated. (Addendum F). On or about October 9, 1985, 
Sixth District Court Judge Don V. Tibbs signed an Order in case number 1402 
terminating Despain's Probation. (Addendum G). 
Seventeen years later, after successfully completing his probation in case 
number 1402, on June 24, 2002, Despain filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
& Dismiss in the Sixth District Court. (Addendum H). On July 7, 2002, Sixth 
District Judge, K.L. Mclff, signed an Order of Dismissal in case 1402, which, in 
accord with the plea negotiations entered into by Despain and the State, granted 
Defendant the benefit of withdrawing his guilty plea and having all charges 
dismissed with prejudice. (Addendum I). In effect, Despain stands an innocent 
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man, having no record of sexual impropriety on his criminal record. Additionally, 
contrary to Defendant's contentions, Judge K.L. Mclff never expunged 
Defendant's record. Thus, this Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury's verdict, and the 
arguments set forth in this Brief, this Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ ^ day of May, 2005. 
ROSS C. BLACKHAM 
Sanpete. Cpunty Attorney 
KEISEL 
Deputy Sanpete County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellee were mailed to JOHN D. SORGE, attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant, 299 South Main Street, 13th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, on this the / r ~ d a y of May, 2005 
v7 / ^ 
A^2tfr<i c< /)<*&C 
is 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-5-303. Custodial interference. 
(1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custo 
dial inteiference if, without good cause, the actor takes, 
entices, conceals, or detains a child under the age of 16 from 
its paient, guardian, or other lawful custodian 
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so, and 
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period substan 
tially longer than the parent time or custody period 
previously awaided by a court of competent jurisdiction 
(2) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custo 
dial interference if, having actual physical custody of a child 
under the age of 16 pursuant to a judicial award of any court 
of competent jurisdiction which grants to another person 
parent time, visitation, or custody rights, and without good 
cause the actor conceals or detains the child with intent to 
deprive the other person of lawful parent time, visitation, or 
custody rights 
(3) Custodial interference is a class A misdemeanor unless 
the child is removed and taken from one state to another, in 
which case it is a felony of the third degree 2001 
JUDICIAL CODE 
78-2a-3. Com t of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Couit of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex 
traordinaiy writs and to issue all writs and process necessary 
(a) to c a n y into effect its judgments, oiders, and de 
crees, or 
(b) in aid of its junsdiction 
(2) The Couit of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final ordeis and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals fiom 
the district court review of infoimal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Ti ust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
toi of the Department of Natuial Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district couit review of 
(1) adjudicative pioceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state 01 other local agencies, and 
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63 46a 12 1, 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
(d) mteilocutory appeals fiom any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degiee or capital felony, 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony, 
(i) appeals from oiders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a fiist 
degree or capital felony, 
(g) appeals from the oiders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degiee or capital felony, 
(h) appeals from district couit involving domestic rela 
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul 
ment, property division, child custody, support, parent-
time, visitation, adoption, and paternity, 
d) appeals fiom the Utah Military Court, and 
(j) cases tiansferred to the Court of Appeals fiom the 
Supreme Court 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of foui judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Couit for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction 
(4) l h e Court of Appeals shall comply with the require 
ments of Title 63, Chaptei 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its leview of agency adjudicative proceedings 2001 
HUSBAND AND WIFE 
30-3-37. Relocation. 
(1) When either parent decides to move fiom the state of 
Utah or 150 miles oi more fiom the lesidence specified in the 
couit's decree, that paient shall provide if possible 60 days 
advance written notice of the intended relocation to the other 
parent The written notice of relocation shall contain state 
ments affirming the following 
(a) the paient time piovisions in Subsection (5) or a 
schedule appioved by both paities will be followed, and 
(b) neither parent will inteifere with the other's paren 
tal rights pursuant to court oidered parent tune ariange 
ments, or the schedule appioved by both parties 
(2) The court may, upon motion of any paity oi upon the 
couits own motion, schedule a hearing with notice to leview 
the notice of ielocation and paient time schedule as provided 
in Section 30 3 35 and make appiopnate oiders icgaiding the 
parent time and costs foi parent time ti ansportation 
(3) In determining the parent time schedule and allocating 
the transportation costs, the couit shall consider 
(a) the reason for the patent's ielocation, 
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both paients in 
exercising paient time, 
(c) the economic resources of both parents, and 
(d) other factors the couit considers necessary and 
lelevant 
(4) Upon the motion of any party, the court may oidei the 
parent intending to move to pay the costs of transportation for 
(a) at least one visit per year with the othei parent, and 
lb) any number of additional visits as determined eq-
uitable by the coui t 
(5) Unless otherwise oidered by the court, upon the reloca-
tion of one of the paities the following schedule shall be the 
minimum requirements for paient time with a school age 
child 
(a) in jears ending m an odd number, the child shall 
spend the following holidays with the noncustodial par-
ent 
d) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday 
until Sunday, and 
(n) the fall school bieak, if applicable, beginning 
the last da> of school before the holiday until the day 
before school resumes, 
(b) in yeais ending in an even number, the child shall 
spend the following holidays with the noncustodial par-
ent 
(l) the entne winter school bieak period, and 
(n) Spnng bieak beginning the last day of school 
before the holiday until the day before school re 
sumes, and 
(c) extended paient time equal to Vfe of the summer oi 
ofT track time foi consecutive weeks rIhe week before 
school begins may not be counted as pait of the summer 
period 
(6) Upon the motion of any party, the court may oider 
uninteirupted paient time with the noncustodial paient for a 
minimum of 30 days during extended parent time, unless the 
court finds it is not in the best inteiests of the child If the 
court oiders uninteirupted paient time dining a penod not 
covered by this section, it shall specify in its oider which 
parent is responsible foi the child's tiavel expenses 
(7) Unless otherwise ordered by the couit the relocating 
party shall be responsible for all the child's travel expenses 
relating to Subsections (5 Ha) and (b) and xh of the child s travel 
expenses relating to Subsection <5Kc), piovided the noncusto 
dial party is cuirent on all suppoit obligations If the noncus 
todial paity has been found in contempt foi not being cuirent 
on all support obligations, he shall be lesponsible for all of the 
child's travel expenses under Subsection (5), unless the couit 
rules otherwise Reimbursement by either lesponsible paity 
to the other for the childs tiavel expenses shall be made 
within 30 days of teceipt of documents detailing those ex 
penses 
(8) The court may apply this provision to any preexisting 
decree of divorce 
(9) Any action under this section may be set for an expe 
dited hearing 
(10) A paient who fails to comply with the notice of reloca-
tion in Subsection (1) shall be in contempt of the couit's order 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 401. Character e v i d e n c e not admissible to prove 
conduc t ; excep t ions ; other c r imes . 
(a) Character evidence generally Evidence of a person's 
chaiacter or a trait of chaiacter is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving action in confoimity therewith on a partic-
ular occasion, except 
(a)(1) Charactet of accustd Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
chaiacter offered bv an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted 
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of 
the accused offered by the prosecution, 
(a)(2) Chaiactei of alleged victim Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by 
an accused, or by the piosecution to lebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor, 
(a)(3) Character of witness Evidence of the character of a 
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609 
(b) Other crimes, wiongs, or CH ts Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs oi acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith It may, 
however, be admissible for other pui poses, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake oi accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide leasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, 
of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at 
trial 
Addendum B 
ROSS C. BLACKHAM 
Sanpete County Attorney 
Bank of Ephrairn Building 
Ephraim, Utah 84627 HIED 
Telephone: 283-4646 SANPETF COUNTY,UTAH 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND. R|& ^RN$$T]8 C&&NTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, * 
P l a i n t i f f * 
v s . * I N F O R M A T I O N 
CLAYTON DESPAIN * Criminal No. /jfoA^ 
Defendant * 
The Defendant herein, Clayton Despain, having been duly bound over to 
this Court by Louis G. Tervort, Judge of the Tenth Circuit Court in and for 
Sanpete County, State of Utah, pursuant to a preliminary hearing on the 5th day 
of January, 1984, to answer to the charges by the State of Utah, and the Defendant 
having been present at the time appointed for preliminary hearing and represented 
by his attorney, Michael Labrum, Richfield, Utah. 
Now, therefore, Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney, accuses the 
Defendant of Rape contrary to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 76-5-402, and 
charges that: 
On or before August 16, 1983, in Centerfield, Utah, Defendant 
did have sexual intercourse with another person, not the Defendantfs 
spouse, and without the person's consent, to-wit: Mary Moore, a 
First Degree Felony. 
In violation of law and against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah. 
This Information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
Mary Moore, Cathy Anderson. 
DATED this 11th day of January, 1984. 
10SS C. BLACKHAM 
Sanpete County Attorney 
Addendum C 
ucrA\Ainnci>ii \jr r u o u v J W C I f 
UTAH ARREST AND COURT DISPOSITION REPORT 
Yi-L. 
tAST FIRST 
DESPAIR. Clayton W. 
MIDDLE 
ALIASES. LAST 
AbbL 
FIRSt MIDDLE 
RESIDENCE-
Box 139 . Cantarfield, UT 84622 
SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED 
SIGNATURE OF PERSON-TAKING FINGERPRINTS 
ARRESTING AGENCY I D 
UT020000a 
YOUR FILE NO 
CONTRIBUTING AGENCY I D. 
UT0200000 
YOUR FILE NO 
MICROFILM REEL AND FRAME 
CDR NO 
UBI NO 
FBI NO 
OCCUPATION 
DATE OF BIRTH 
08/04/59 
SEX 
M 
RACE 
PLACE OF BIRTH 
HGT 
5 f6 
DAT! OF ARREST 
12/12/83 
T40 W EYES hatal 
AGENCY NEXT APPEAR. 
SCARS, MARKS, TATTOOS, AND AMP 
Snail acara on hands 
DATt OF OFFENSE INITIAL CHARGE DESCRIPTION NCIC CODE 
08/16/83 Xap* Codmi 76-5-402 
ARREST DISP. DATE Arrest Disposition D Rel to Other Agency 208 D No Bill Returned 
U Rel - No Formol Charge 207 Q Ref to Juvenile Auth 212 Q Held 205 
D Rel on Boil or own Recog. 206 D Dismissed W / O Trial 207 D Deceased 202 
211 D Other . 
CITY/JP ARRAIGNMENT SECTION 
1 NCIC AGENCY ID 
| c 1 M 1 ° 
1 
2 
3 
PLEA 
D Guilty 
D Not Guilty 
D Guilty 
D Not Guilty 
Q Guilty 
D Not Guilty 
PROSECUTOR 
DISPOSITION 
D Prosecute 
U Declined 
D Prosecute 
D Declined 
D Prosecute 
D Declined 
RELEASE DATE: 
RELEASE A O I O N : 
CASE NO. 
D Own Recognizance n 
O Bail 
O Other 
2 
ARRAIGNMENT DATE 
CHANGE IN CHARGE DESCRIPTION 
D Committed in Default 13 
D Committed Without Bail 14 
NCIC 
CODE | 
BAIL/BOND AMOUNT 1 
$ 
CITY/JP PRELIMINARY HEARING SECTION 
| DATE OF HEARING 
[ c 
N 
O 
| 1 
2 
3 
RESULTS OF HEARING 
D Dismissed O Red. to Misd. 
D Bound Over a Ref. os Misd 
D Dismissed O Red.to Misd. 
D Bound Over D Ref as Misd 
D Dismissed D Red.to Misd. 
O Bound Over D Ref. os Misd 
AGENCY REFERRED TO 
CHANGE IN CHARGE DESCRIPTION 
NCIC 
CODE 
DISTRICT COURT ARRAIGNMENT SECTION 
1 NCIC COURT CODE 
c 
M 
O 
1 
2 
3 
PLEA 
D Guilty 
a Not Guilty 
O Guilty 
D Not Guilty 
D Guilty 
D Not Guilty 
CASE NO. FILING DATE TYPE FILING-
D Information D Grand Jury D Other 
CHANGE IN CHARGE DESCRIPTION 
NCIC 
CODE 
TYPE TRIAL TYPS COUNSEL 
ALL COURTS DISPO 
n e^u n s*k*L_. 
SITION SECTION 
DATE TRIAL BEGINS DATE TRIAL ENDS 
Addendum D 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SAHPrTL STATE OF UTAH 
DON V. TIBBS, Judge Date '' 1 ' ^ i v l 
C. Howard Watkin, Court Reporter Case No. ''V):' 
Ouuye Lou is G. T e r v o r l , Pi <?<jidin.' 
TITLE (Parties Present) COUNSEL (Counsel Present) 
THE STATE OF UTAH,
 R o s s f_ ulackham. Attorney for l»lf. 
-vs- Marcus Tavlor, Ailorney aI I <->w. Appearing 
CLAYTON Dl SPAIN, for Michael l.abnim, A U < » ' K - / for Uefendant. 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceedings Before the Court ( ) DIVORCE 
( ) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
ARRAIGNMENT ( ) SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
( ) PROBATE 
( ) CRIMINAL 
( ) ADOPTION 
( ) OTHER 
Plea bargaining lias been entered i n t o . Defendant, o r i g i n a l l y charged wi th rapp. 
Changed to "Unlawful Sexual Intercoursn" a Lhnd Degr°o f f l ony . Iirlondani advised 
of hib r i g h t s , and ppi TPQ a plea at t h i ^ Hive of "no lon f - ' s t " . A iV* '.«>n'ontr 
r rpor t w i l l lie made print- to sentencing ?n March 14, MH'A, al lf>:°0 /". P! 
Defendant i > out on own recogni^inc1 , 
Addendum E 
FILED 
Si.NPET- ^M*'TY f UTAH 
W I1AR 11 AH 9 49 
ROSS C. BLACKHAM 
Sanpete County Attorney 
Bank of Ephraim Building 
Ephraim, Utah 34627 
Telephone: 283-4646 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF , k N ^ P ' C ^ S f t C ^ J f ' 
STATE OF UTAH a ^ UO 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
vs, 
Plaintiff 
CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN 
Defendant 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF PROBATION 
Criminal No. 1402 
OFFENSE: Unlawful Sexual Intercourse, a Third Degree Felony, No Contest Plea 
APPEARANCES: Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney, and Michael Labrum, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
No legal reason having been shown why Judgment should not be pronounced, 
it is the judgment of the Court as follows: 
The Defendant is hereby sentenced to a term not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison and fined the sum of $5,000.00. The prison sentence and 
all but $1,000.00 of the fine is suspended and Defendant is placed on probation 
to the Department of Adult Probation and Parole for a period of 18 months; the 
suspension of sentence and the probation being conditioned on the following terms: 
1. That Defendant enter into an agreement with Adult Probation and Parole 
and comply by the terms and condition thereof. 
2. Defendant shall be required to report to Adult Probation and Parole and to 
the Court whenever requested. 
3. Defendant shall serve 90 days in the Sanpete County Jail provided, 
however, that a regular work-release program is authorized provided suitable 
arrangements a^e made with the Sanpete County Sheriff and provided that the 90 
days are actually served within a period of one year's time. Further, that in 
- 2 -
the event Defendant wishes to serve h is 90 days in the Sevier County J a i l and 
arrangements can be made there fo re , tha t Sanpete County S h e r i f f i s author ized 
t o t rans fe r Defendant to Sevier County J a i l and that Defendant is ordered to 
assume and pay a l l costs of incarcera t ion charged to Sanpete County fo r any 
t r ans fe r to the Sevier County J a i l . 
4. Defendant shal l have no assoc ia t ion or contact o f any k ind w i th the 
v i c t i m in t h i s case. 
5. Defendant shal l abstain from a l l in tox ican ts o f any k i n d , inc lud ing 
w ine , beer and l i q u o r . 
6. Defendant shal l take no c o n t r o l l e d substances except as prescr ibed 
by a l icensed phys ic ian . 
7. Defendant shal l not cohabi tate w i th any female not Defendant's legal 
and lawful w i f e . 
8. Defendant shal l not associate w i th anyone convicted o f a fe lony or w i th 
anyone on pa ro le . 
9. Defendant shal l not frequent or v i s i t any bars or taverns . 
10. Defendant shal l pay the remaining $1,000.00 f i n e on a monthly basis 
i n such sums as are arranged wi th Adul t Probation and Parole and the same shal l be 
paid w i t h i n a per iod of one year. 
11 . Defendant shal l no v io la te any c i t y , county, s tate or other law. 
12. I f Defendant successful ly completes the probation as described here in , 
the Court w i l l , upon motion by Defendant or his a t torney, al low Defendant to 
withdraw the g u i l t y plea and enter a Not Gu i l t y plea and therea f te r dismiss the 
charges and case against the Defendant. 
13. That dur ing the term of his probation Defendant shal l s t r i c t l y comply 
w i th support ob l i ga t ions owed to ch i l d ren /w i fe from his former marriage and/or any 
cw <angements or agreements heretofore entered in to with the Of f i c e ^ f j t e c o very 
Services fo r the reimbursement of same. 
DATED t h i s 2 ^ V day of March, 1984. 
;he f f ice o f Recovery 
8«* 
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200 STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION \ND PAROLE 
STAY REPORT 
FILED 
3ANPE^: r^ 'DATE^, , August 20, 1985 
Judge DON V. TIBBS, Sixth District Court, Sanpete rmmt-'y 
— " '85 (JIT 9 Pft If Ift 
Name DESPAIN, Clayton William File No. 1402 
Offense Unlawful Sexual Intercourse. Third Deefrfee ^elony^. vitPteced on Probation 3/14/84 
B Y
^ ^ W ^ F P U J Y <date> 
Address Box 139, Centerfield, Utah 84622 Employment Cox Rock Products 
Comments: Mr. Despain resides in Centerfield, Utah, and i s employed by Cox Rock Products 
as a mechanic. He has had th i s employment for the last four years. He has paid his f ine 
in f u l l . No negative reports have been received concerning him. I t i s respectfully 
recommended that he be terminated from probation. 
Recommendations: TERMINATION 
( ) Instructed to appear CL/SO&LL„ <T. ^ £ < f e ^ d 
(X) Recommend appearance be excused William E. Strode, District Agent 
Addendum G 
ROSS C. BLACKHAM 
Sanpete County Attorney 
Bank of Ephraim Bu i ld ing 
Ephraim, Utah 84627 
Telephone: 283-4646 
> v'l 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY ' • ' - • - ' i - ! . " " . 
I ^J^^^^n^S^: PUT; STATE OF UTAH ~—«ia—• 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs . 
CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN 
Defendant 
MOTION AND ORDER TERMINATING 
PROBATION 
Criminal No. 1402 
The State of Utah, through the Sanpete County Attorney, hereby moves 
the above entitled Court for an Order Terminating the Probation of the Defendant, 
CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN , and releasing him from the terms of his 
probation agreement with Adult Probation and Parole pursuant to an Order of 
the Court dated March 26, 1984 . 
The basis for this motion is that Defendant has satisfactorily complied 
with the terms of his probation for the required period of time, and has 
paid all fines required in full and Adult Probation and Parole has recommended 
and requested that the probation be terminated and Defendant released therefrom. 
D'NTED this 9th day of October ,1985 . 
Motion and Order Terminating Probation 
Criminal No» 1402 
page 2 
13 IR £ £ £ 
Pursuant to the motion of Sanpete County Attorney, and upon request 
and recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole, and the Court finding the 
Defendant has satisfactorily complied with the terms of his probation 
agreement and his probation in this matter should be terminated; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN , is hereby released from the terms 
of his probation agreement and probation in this matter is hereby 
terminated. 
DATED this 9th day of October 1985 
Addendum H 
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DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290 
Attorney for Defendant 
1st South Main, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (435)835-5055 
Facsimile: (435)835-5057 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA & DISMISS 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Case No. 1402 
CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN : JUDGE 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Clayton William Despain, by and through his counsel, 
Douglas L. Neeley, and hereby moves this Court to allow the withdrawal of his guilty plea and enter 
an order of dismissal with prejudice of the above-entitled matter. This motion is based and 
supported upon the following: 
1. That the Defendant plead guilty and a Judgment & Order of Probation was entered on or 
about the 27th day of March, 1984. (See copy of attached Judgment & Order of Probation marked 
as Exhibit "A".) 
w r t > 
UTY 
2. That pursuant to the Judgment & Order of Probation, the Defendant was required to fulfill 
certain obligations and refrain from further law violations. Further, the Defendant was ordered to 
fulfill a jail term, pay a fine, and comply strictly with all terms of a probationary agreement with 
Adult Probation and Parole. 
3. That the Defendant did strictly comply with all the terms and conditions of his probation 
and Adult Probation and Parol recommended a successful termination. (See copy of Adult Parole 
and Probation recommendation marked and attached as Exhibit "B".) 
4. That based upon the Defendant's successful completion of all probationary terms, the 
State of Utah, per County Attorney Ross C. Blackham, moved this Court for an order of successful 
completion of probation. On or about October 9, 1985, the Court signed an Order. (See copy of 
Motion & Order Terminating Probation marked and attached as Exhibit "C".) 
5. That the original Judgment & Order at paragraph no. 12 allowed for the Defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea and a dismissal of the charges if he successfully complied with all terms of 
his probation. 
6. That over seventeen (17) years have now passed and the Defendant continues to remain 
a good father, provider, grandfather, and law abiding citizen. 
DATED this <% V day of June, 2002. 
DOUGLAS L. NEELE Y 
Attorney for Defendant 
Addendum I 
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DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290 
Attorney for Defendant 
1st South Main, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (435)835-5055 
Facsimile: (435)835-5057 
SA> 
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IN THE SLXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAYTON WILLIAM DESPAIN 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 1402 
JUDGE 
BASED upon the motion and stipulation of the parties, and for good cause showing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That the Defendant's plea of guilty is hereby withdrawn. 
2. That all charges in this matter are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this ( day of Jtme7^D02. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ROSS C. BLACKHAM 
Sanpete County Attorney 
•d&e= 
